



In this article, Spinoza's approach to freedom is investigated. Can his position 
convincingly be maintained? In section I,four possible views are presented. Some 
attention is given to Hobbes and Descartes, not merely on the ground that the 
influence of both thinkers on Spinoza has been considerable, but also because 
their positions are quite clear and provide useful contributions to the discussion. 
In this way, the background for Spinoza's thoughts is presented while his balan-
ced position may be dealt with. Section 11 focuses on the role necessity plays in 
Spinoza's philosophy. God serves as the starting-point, and Spinoza manages to 
devise a remarkable analysis, not eschewing radical conclusions. There doesn't 
seem to be any room left for freedom, but in sections III and IV, respectively, it 
is pointed out why God and man are nonetheless free. In the case of God, this is 
coJtnected with the way he l exists. For man, freedom may result from an attitude; 
it all depends on the way he deals with the necessity with which he is confronted. 
This intricate approach appears to be inconsistent, however, and an alternative 
may be required. Section V is concerned with one viable way of thinking. 
I. The concepts of freedom 
In order to make it clear how Spinoza perceives freedom, a number of possible 
approaches need to be discerned. Four possibilities will be outlined in this sec-
tion; the first two, unlike the latter two, are relatively straightforward. 
The simplest, first, approach to freedom consists in regarding it as the absence 
of external impediments. This is Hobbes's position.2 Freedom, for man, lies, in 
his perspective, in having a possibility to follow one's will: »A FREE-MAN, is he, 
that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred 
to doe what he has a will to.«3 
Should one leave it at this, stating or supposing that, on this basis, man is also 
free in a more fundamental sense than this, little is said (this doesn't apply to 
Hobbes, who, as will be shown, complements this position with a valuable train 
of thought). It is merely stated that the fact that one may move unhindered is 
sufficient to ascertain freedom to decide whether one will move in some way. 
1 I do not use a capital here, which is, in my view, in line with Spinoza's conception (a capital 
is used in }God<, in accordance with the orthography in Spinoza's writings [>Deus<]). 
2 Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, ch. 14, 21,ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge 2007) 91, 145. 
3 Ibid. ch. 21, ed. by R. Thck, 146. 
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The most important question in this respect is whether one may determine 
one's own actions. If this isn't the case, one is guided, or rather determined, by 
causes one doesn't control. In the context of this first approach - freedom as the 
absence of external impediments -, both options are still present: a stone, being 
rolled down the street, e.g., is free, whereas it is not supposed to have caused 
its own movement. The question whether man is free in another sense than this 
one cannot, accordingly, be answered on the basis of this approach; someone is 
already >free< if he isn't chained or contained, in which case the reason why be 
acts isn't dealt with. 
The point, accordingly, is to settle the cause of an action. In the second ap-
proach, the will is the crucial element. Whether there are external causes that al-
low one to complete one's action is not the issue; the will is decisive. Descartes's 
point of view is clear: »[W]hoever turns out to have created us, and however 
powerful and however deceitful he may be, in the meantime we nonetheless ex-
perience within us the kind of freedom which enables us always to refrain from 
believing things which are not completely certain and thoroughly examined.«4 
According to Descartes, it is self-evident that man has a free will.s He finds 
support for this in the idea that one experiences the freedom to suspend one's 
judgment.6 Descartes claims that one is free, because one may suspend one's 
judgment. Still, the question remains why one acts thus; what is the basis for the 
suspension of judgment? Does one decide for oneself to do this, or not? The crux 
of the matter is, in other words, passed over by Descartes. 
If one considers the issue in this way, the same problem emerges as in the first 
approach, freedom being interpreted as freedom of movement: the question lies 
beyond the level at which one is trying to find an answer. So the question should 
be: where does the will itself originate? Is the agent its cause, or not? Hobbes 
appears to point this out by indicating, supplementing his point of view repro-
duced above, that there is no such thing as ,free wilk ,,[F]rom the use of the 
word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the 
Liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what 
he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe.«7 
4 »[A] quocunque tandem simus, & quantumvis ille sit patens, quantumvis fallax, hanc ni-
hilominus in nobis Iibertatem esse experimur, ut simper ab iis credendis, quae non plane certa 
sunt & explorata, possimus abstinere; atque ita cavere, ne unquam erremus.« Rem! Descartes: 
Principia Philosophiae, I, 6. ffiuvres, ed. par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery [""AT], vol. 8 (Paris 
1964) 6. The Philosophical Writings, ed. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch [""CSM}, voL 
I (Cambridge 1990) 194. 
5 Ibid. I,39.AT 19. CSM 205,206. In this case, I have omitted inverted commas around }free 
wil1< as Descartes's view, who takes the notion seriously, is represented. The same applies to the 
passage below (note 9, infra), where Spinoza doesn't use inverted commas. In other occurrences, 
the commas are used. 
6 Ibid. t, 39. AT 20. CSM 206. 
7 111. Hobbes: Leviathan, ch. 21,ed. by R. Tuck, [see note 2] 146. 
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Spinoza's perspective agrees with this and so provides, at the same time, a 
criticism of Descartes's position.8 The will always has a cause: »There is no ab-
solute or free will in the mind, but the mind is determined to will this or that by 
a cause, which is also determined by another cause, and this again by another, 
and so to infinity.«9 
If one claims that there is something like a >free will<, one doesn't consider 
the fact that the agent doesn't determine his own will. Supporters of the ,free 
will< decision realize, of course, that external circumstances are partly decisive 
for the outcome, but according to them, the >free will< decision is located at a se-
parate level, or exists in some other way. The question then arises to what degree 
one may determine for oneself how one deals with the objects on which the will 
is focused. Spinoza denies this to be possible to any degree. 
Even God does not act on the basis of a ,free will<;lO »If God had another un-
derstanding and will in acting, his essence, too, would necessarily be another.«l1 
If God had acted differently from what is actually the case, the world would be 
different as well: »From the necessity of the divine nature, infinitely many things 
must follow in infinite ways (that is, everything which can fall under an object of 
infinite intellect).«12 
Spinoza has two reasons for denying the existence of >free wilk First, >the< 
will is merely an abstraction of the particular exercises of will one knows: »Since 
man has a different will from one moment to the next, he forms a general thing 
in his soul, which he calls will, just as he forms an idea of man from this and 
that particular man. Since he doesn't distinguish the immediate beings clearly 
enough from the conceptual beings, it happens that he characterizes the con-
ceptual beings as things which truly exist in nature, and accordingly presents 
himself as a cause of some things, just as this frequently happens in the matter 
we are discussing. For if one should ask anyone why people want this or that, 
he would answer: because they have a will. Yet, as the will is but an idea of 
wanting this or that and therefore only a way of thinking, a conceptual thing 
and no real thing, nothing can be caused by it. For nothing comes from nothing. 
And so I think, since we have demonstrated that the will is not a thing in na-
8 There is some disagreement as to how the passages from Descartes's work referred to 
above should be interpreted, since his views may be somewhat more balanced, especially when 
one considers Descartes's other works (cf. John Cottingham: The Intellect, the Will and the 
Passions. Spinoza's Critique of Descartes. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1988) 
239-257, esp. 250-254), but this doesn't seem to me to alleviate the criticism of his position. 
9 >>In Mente nulla est absoluta, sive libera voluntas; sed Mens ad hoc, vel illud volendum de-
terminatur a causa, quae etiam ab alid determinata est, & haec iternm ab aUa, & sic in infinitum.« 
Ethica, part 11, prop. 48. Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg 1925) [=Opera] vol. 2, 129, 
10 Ethica, part I, prop. 32, cor. I. Opera vol. 2, 73. 
11 »[S]i Deus alium iotellectum actu habuisset, & aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia 
necessaria esset { ... }.« Ethica, part I, prop. 33,schol. 11. Opera vol. 2, 75, 
12 »Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellec-
turn infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent,« Ethica, part I, prop. 16. Opera vol. 2,60. 
56 Jasper Doomen 
ture, but only an imagination, that one need not ask whether the will be free 
or not.«13 
Second, according to Spinoza, »the will may not be called a free cause, but 
only a necessary one.«14 After all, if one were to speak of a >free cause<, one 
would have to indicate wherein freedom might consist. Here, Spinoza does use 
the word >will< as a meaningful unit. One may question whether he maintains the 
conceptualism15 displayed in his early KV (KV is, according to some, Spinoza's 
first piece of writing); in, among other writings, Ethica, there are, at any rate, 
proofs that he clings to a conceptualistic position, such as in the following defi-
nition: » To the essence of some thing. that, I say, belongs, the presence of which 
necessarily brings the thing about and the absence of which necessarily negates 
it; or that without which the thing, and vice versa that which without the thing 
doesn't exist, nor may be comprehended.«16 
This doesn't mean that Spinoza lacks a positive position with regard to 
freedom. This is expressed in the third and fourth approaches. In the third 
approach, it is stated that the being which determines its own being is free: 
»The true freedom is nothing else than the first cause.«17; so »God alone is the 
13 »[O]mdat de mensch nu deze dan die Wtl heeft,zoo maakt hy in syn ziele een algemeene 
wyze, die hy Wille Doemt, gelyk hy oak zoo uyt deze man, en die man, een Idea maakt van 
mensch: en omdat hy de dadelyke wezens niet genoeg van de wezens van reeden en onder-
scheid, zoo gebeurt het dat hy de wezens van reeden aanmerkt als diugen die waarlyk in de Na-
tuur zyn, en zoo zig zelfs aJs een oorzaak stelt van eenige dingen, geJyk in de verhandeling van 
de zaak waar af wy spreeken niet wynig en gebeurt. Want als men iemand vraagt, waarom de 
mensch dit of dat wil: men antwoord, omdat zy een Wil hebben: dog aangezien de Wil [ ... ] maar 
een Idea is van dit of dat te willen, en daarom maar een wyze van denken: een Ens Rationis en 
geen Ens Reale, zoo en kan dan van haar niets veroorzaakt worden. Nam ex nihilo nihil fit. En 
zoo meen ik oak als wy getoont hebben, dat de Wille geen zaak is in de Natuur, maar alleen een 
verzieringe, men niet en behoeft te vraagen of de Wil vry of niet vry is.« Korte Verhandeling van 
God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand [=KV], part 11, ch. XVI. Opera vol.l, 82, 83. 
14 ) Voluntas non potest vocari causa Ubera, sed tantilm necessaria.« Ethica, part I, prop. 32. 
Opera vol. 2,72. 
15 I qualify his position as conceptualistic, rather than as nominalistic, which is also pos-
sible (cf. e.g. Hubertus Hubbeling: Spinoza's Methodology [Assen 1964] 22), and reserve >nomi-
nalism< for a radical position such as Roscelin's (cf. for Roscelin's stance Eike-Renner Kiuge: 
Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of Universais. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 
(1976) 495-414, esp. 411,412; cL for the classification Willard Van Orman Quine: On What There 
Is. In: id: From a Logical Point of View [Cambridge, Mass. 1953] 14,15). Berkeley's position, e.g., 
may be qualified as conceptualistic: he argues against the existence of abstract ideas (George 
Berkeley: A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, introd. §§ 10, 11, 13. The 
Works (London 1949] vol. 2, 29-32), but clings to general ideas, realized by particular ones serv-
ing as models (ibid .. introd. § 12 [vo!. 2, 31, 32]. § 15 [vo!. 2, 33. 34]). 
16 »Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico, quo data res necessarib ponitur & quo sub~ 
lata res necessaria toHitur; vel id, sine quo res, & vice versa quod sine re nec esse, nec concipi 
potest.« Ethica, part 11, def. 11. Opera val. 2, 84. 
17 »de waare vrybeid is alleen of niet anders als de eerste oorzaak«. KV, part I, ch. IV, Opera 
voI.1,37. 
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only free cause.«18 »God acts solely from the laws of his nature, forced by no 
one.«19 
Meanwhile, Spinoza keeps emphasizing necessity: everything necessarily en-
sues from God's being. To many defenders of freedom, this idea is impossible: 
necessity is absent where freedom begins and vice versa. In Spinoza's view, how-
ever, the notions are reconcilable: »1 have in the same way stated that everything 
follows with an inevitable necessity from God's nature, as everybody states that 
it follows from God's nature that he understands himself; which surely nobody 
denies to follow necessarily from the divine nature; and yet nobody takes it that 
God understands himself forced by some fate; instead, he does so entirely free, 
albeit necessarily«;2o »As soon as 1 perceive that the three angles of a triangle 
are necessarily equal to two right ones, I also deny that it happens coincidentally. 
Similarly, as soon as I perceive that heat is the necessary consequence of fire, I 
also deny that it happens coincidentally. That necessary and free are two contrar-
ies seems no less absurd and conflicting with reason: for nobody may deny that 
God knows himself and all other things; yet all with one voice concede that God 
knows himself necessarily.«21 This complex train of thought is problematic. I will 
deal with it more thoroughly than here in section Ill. 
The fourth approach isolates an element which supposedly lies outside the 
necessarily evolving process. It is taken into consideration that all events take 
place in a necessary way, but there is still room for freedom. This line of thought 
is crucial in Spinoza's philosophy. Reason is the decisive element for him. It is 
not the case that one wouldn't act necessarily; as was pointed out in the discus-
sion of his attitude regarding >free will<, one can't evade this necessity and a 
notion of freedom that doesn't discount this is incorrect. It is, on the contrary, 
decisive that one realizes to be >delivered< to necessity.22 
18 »God alIeen [is] de eenigste vrye oorzaak«. KV, part I, ch. IV, ibid. 38. 
19 »Deus ex solis suae naturae Jegibus, & d nemine coactus agit.« Ethica, part I, prop. 17. 
Opera vel. 2, 61. 
20 »[E]go eadem modo statui, omnia inevitabili necessitate ex Dei natura sequi, ac omnes 
statuunt, ex Dei natura sequi, quod se ipsum intelIigit: quod sane nemo negat ex divinl1 naturl1 
necessaria sequi, & tamen nemo concipit, quOd Deus fato aliquo coactus, sed quod oomina 
Iibere, tametsi necessaria, seipsum intelligat.« Letter 43. Opera vol. 4, 221, 222. 
21 »Quam primum animadverto, tres trianguli angulos duobus rectis necessaria aequales 
esse, nego quoque id casu fieri. Similiter, quam primum adverto, caJorem necessarium ignis esse 
effectum, nego quoque id casu accidere. Quod Necessarium ac Liberum duo contraria sunt, 
non minus absurdum, & rationi repugnans videtur: nam nemo negare potest, Deum seipsum, & 
caetera omnia libere cognoscere; & tamen cuncti communi suffragio cancedunt, Deum seipsum 
necessaria cognoscere.« Letter 56. Opera vol. 4, 259. 
22 Tractatus Politicus [=TP] ch. 11, §7. Opera vol. 3, 279. This is not, by the way, the right 
phrase to describe Spinoza's proposition: one is,in his view,just free if one is aware of the neces-
sity which lies at the root of one's actions. In order to indicate the difference between (neces-
sarily) bringing about something oneself and (necessarily) undergoing something, Spinoza pres-
ents this nuance: »1 say that we act when something within or outside us takes place of which we 
are the adequate cause, in other words, [ ... ] when something within or outside us follows from 
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One will gain peace of mind through this insight: »In so far as the mind un-
derstands all things as necessary, so far it has a greater power over the affects, or 
is less acted on by them. «23 The degree to which one succeeds in accomplishing 
this depends on one's ability to use one's reasoning powers: )} The more perfec-
tion each being has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on, and, conversely, 
the more it acts, the more perfect it is.<<24 Freedom consists in the insight that 
freedom in the sense of >free will< isn't possible. 
11ris section was primarily focused on indicating what >freedom< means for 
Spinoza. He presents an uncompromising and clear train of thought. There are, 
however, important problems which must be addressed. I will deal with these in 
sections III and IV, after having elaborated on the notion of necessity in section n. 
II. The all-embracing necessity in nature 
According to Spinoza, the only existing thing is the substance,25 which he also 
designates as God26 or nature.27 He thus, idiosyncratically, only acknowledges 
a single substance, which has important consequences. Since the world has de-
veloped according to God's nature, a necessary process takes place: »All things 
follow from God's eternal decree with the same necessity as it follows from the 
essence of the triangle that its three angles are equal to two right ones. «28 After 
all, God couldn't have acted differently than he has acted.z9 This means that 
nothing exists coincidentally, »but all things are determined to exist and operate 
in a certain way from the necessity of the divine nature.«30 
our nature, which can only be understood clearly and distinctly from that nature. I say, on the 
other hand, that we are acted on when something within us takes place or something follows 
from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.« (»Nos turn agere dico, cum aJiquid in 
nobis, aut extra nos fit, cujus adaequata sumus causa, hoc est { ... ], cum ex nostra natura aliquid 
in nobis, aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solarn potest clare, & distincte intelligi. At 
contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit, vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cujus nos non, 
nisi partialis, sumus causa.« Ethlca, part Ill, dei 11. Opera vol. 2, 139. That is why he says that it 
belongs to the nature of reason to consider things as necessary (Ethica, part n, prop. 44. Opera 
vol. 2, 125). After all, if one utilizes one's reason, one acts and is aware of the necessity. 
23 »Quatenus Mens res omnes, ut necessarias intelligit, eatenus majorem in affectas potentiam 
habet, seu minus ab iisdem patitur.« Ethica, part V, prop. 6. Opera vol. 2, 284. 
24 »Quo unaquaeque res plus per/ectionis habet, eo magis agit, & minus patUur, & contra, quo 
magis agit, eo perfectior est.« Ethica, part V, prop. 40. Opera vol. 2, 306. 
25 Ethica, part I, prop. 14, cor. n. Opera vol. 2, 56, 
26 Ethica, part I, prop. 11. Opera vol. 2, 52. 
27 Ethica, part IV, praef. Opera vol. 2, 206. 
28 »[O]mnia ab aetemo Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur, ac ex essentia trianguli 
sequitur, quod tres ejus anguli sunt aequaJes duobus rectis.« Ethica, part n, prop. 49, schol. 
Opera vol. 2, 136. 
29 Ethica, part I, prop, 33. Opera vol. 2, 73. 
30 »[S]ed omnia ex [necessitate] divinae naturae determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum, 
& operandum.« Ethica, part I, prop. 29. Opera vol. 2, 70. 
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Spinoza discerns, besides this, a positive approach: »1 call particular things 
contingent insofar as we, as long as we only regard their essence, find nothing 
which necessarily posits their existence or necessarily excludes it.«31 This doesn't 
mean that such things don't necessarily exist; rather, they don't exist as the 
beings they are. In this sense, only one being necessarily exists, namely God. His 
being involves existence,32 which is not the case for other beings.331bis position 
follows from the two kinds of necessity he discerns: »A thing is either said to 
be necessary because of its essence, or because of its cause. For the existence of 
some thing either follows necessarily from its essence and definition, or from a 
given efficient cause.«34 
If one considers something as coincidental, in the sense that it would be exclu-
ded from the necessary process according to which the world exists, this merely 
results from a defective knowledge.35 This is an important element in Spinoza's 
exposition. The point is that these contingent things are determined in their ac-
tions: »A thing which has been determined by God to do something cannot ren-
der itself undetermined.«36 This becomes clear in particular in connection with 
the underlying thought that God is the immanent cause of all things.37 
At the same time, Spinoza is aware of the opinion many people share, that 
one may freely decide how one will act. This opinion is insufficient, since one 
doesn't inquire into the basis of one's actions, a problem with which, as was 
pointed out, Descartes, for instance, is confronted. One lacks knowledge of the 
causes of one's actions and consequently considers oneself - mistakenly - to be 
free.38 
In part 2 of Ethica, Spinoza complements this with an analysis of >will<: 
»People are deceived in thinking they are free. This opinion consists entirely in 
this, that they are conscious of their actions, yet ignorant of the causes by which 
these are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of freedom: that they don't 
know any cause of their actions. For what they say, that human actions depend 
on the will, are words of which they have no idea. No one knows, after all, what 
a will is and how it would move the body; those who state something else, and 
31 »Res singulares voco contingentes, quatenus, dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, 
nihil invenimus, quod earum existentiam necessarib ponat, vel quod ipsam necessarib sec1udat.« 
Ethica, part IV, def. Ill. Opera vol. 2, 209. 
32 Ethica, part I, prop. 8, schol. 11. Opera vol. 2, 51. 
33 Ethica, part I, prop. 24. Opera vol. 2, 67. 
34 »Res aJiqua necessaria dicitur, vel ratione suae essentiae, vel ratione causae. Rei enim 
alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essential, & definitione, vel ex dat§ caus§. efficiente necessarib 
sequitur.« Ethica, part I, prop. 33, schoI. I. Opera vol. 2, 74. 
35 Ibid. 
36 »Res, quae ii Deo ad aUquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indetenninatam reddere 
non potest.« Ethica, part I, prop. 27. Opera vol. 2, 68. 
37 Ethica, part I, prop. 18. Opera vol. 2, 63. 
38 Ethica, part I, appendix. Opera vol. 2, 78; part Ill, prop. 2, schol., ibid. 143; part Ill, prop. 
59, schol., ibid. 189. 
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devise seats and dwelling places for the soul, are wont to give rise to laughter or 
nausea.«39 
This is not the reasoning according to which >the< will doesn't exist and is 
merely an abstraction (ct section I), although there may be a parallel here (the 
more abstract a thing is, the less meaning it has for Spinoza40); the issue at hand 
is that a situation in which a will would interact with a body is unclear. The cri-
ticism of Descartes's doctrine, in which the latter resorts to the pineal gland,41 
which would allegedly serve as a sufficient means of explanation, is in line with 
this consideration. 
Spinoza himself evades this problem by stating that body and mind are pro-
perties of God,42 which he can hold since he doesn't, like Descartes, cling to the 
idea of a >free wilk The will isn't something which exists separately and freely; 
it is imbedded in the necessary process which emanates from nature, so: »Those 
who believe that they speak, are silent, or act in whatever way on the basis of a 
free decision of the mind, dream with open eyes.«43 
In Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza puts forth a view that seems, at first 
sight, to conflict with the ideas set out hitherto. He discusses the presence of the 
freedom of speech. He praises the Dutch state, in which one has the opportunity 
to decide one's outlook on life for oneself;44 moreover, one has the right to judge 
freely, a right that extends to matters of religion, since no one can be forced to 
be happy.45 
In accordance with his separation of political and religious power, he states: 
»One is governed in the most violent way where opinions, which are part of 
anyone's right, are considered criminal.«46 Everyone should be granted a free 
judgment in everything except outward actions. 47 This >free judgment< seems 
at odds with the position set out above. It is, however, important what Spinoza 
means by this judgment. This is made clear in the following: »That government is 
39 »Falluntur homines, quod se liberos esse putant, [ ... ] quae opinio in hoc solo consistit, 
quod suarum actionum sint conscii, & ignari causarum, a quibus determinantur. Haec ergo 
est eorum libertatis idea, quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam. Nam quOd ajunt, 
humanas actiones a voluntate pendere, verba sunt, quorum nullam habent ideam. Quid enim 
voluntas sit, & quomodo moveat Corpus, ignorant omnes, qui aJiud jactant, & animae sedes, & 
habitacula fingunt, vel risum, vel nauseam movere solent.« Ethica, part n, prop. 35, schol. Opera 
vol. 2, 117. 
40 Ethica, part n, prop. 40, schol.l. Opera voL 2, 12l. 
41 Ethica, part V, praei Opera vol. 2, 278-280. 
42 Ethica, part n, prop. I. Opera vol. 2, 86; part 11, prop. 2, ibid. 86. 
43 »Qui [ ... ] credunt, se ex libero Mentis decreto loqui, vel tacere, vel quicquam agere, oculis 
apertis somniant.« Ethica, part Ill, prop. 2, schol. Opera vol. 2, 144. 
44 Tractatus theologico-politicus [o:oTTHP], praef. Opera vol. 3, 7. 
45 TTIIP, ch. VII. Opera vol. 3, 117. 
46 ~>[I]bi [ ... 1 violentissime regnatur, ubi opiniones, quae uniuscujusque juris sunt [ ... ], pro 
crimine habentur [ ... 1.« TTHP, ch. XVIII. Opera voL 3, 225. 
47 TTHP, ch. XVIII. Opera vol. 3, 226. 
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the most violent in which the freedom to say and teach what One thinks is denied 
to everyone; on the contrary, that one is moderate, in which that same freedom 
is granted to everyone.«48 
It is exactly because of this position that Spinoza is not struck by the accu-
sation that his views would render a contradiction - although he also points to 
another type of freedom (which will be dealt with in section IV), which is pro-
blematic -, since now only freedom of speech is involved. This type of freedom 
may, in my view, be qualified as the first of the four types outlined in section 1. 
Freedom of speech is, in other words, reconcilable with the idea that ,free will, 
isn't involved in the agent's judgment: one is enabled to decide one's opinion, 
but this situation is no different from the one in which it is allowed that one 
decide where to buy one's groceries, for example; there are several possibilities, 
one of which is selected; the reason why this is done is not at stake at this level. 
The presence of freedom of speech does not, in short, conflict with the absence 
of ) free will<. 
Spinoza has presented a coherent line of thought; there is no >free will< and 
everything happens strictly necessarily. He doesn't leave it at this. Some sort of 
freedom is still possible for both God and man, as was indicated. It is now to be 
explored whether this reasoning produces convincing results. 
Ill. The second interpretation of causa sui 
In the treatment of Spinoza's views on freedom, the notion >causa sui<, >cause 
of itself" must be granted a pivotal position. It plays a fundamental part in his 
metaphysics: it lies in the nature of a substance to exist,49 a proposition which 
follows from Definition 1 of part 1 of Ethica ("By cause of itself, I understand 
that, whose essence involves existence; or that, whose nature cannot be concei-
ved, if not as existing.«).50 
Although Spinoza appears to be critical of the notion in KV,Sl it serves as a 
keynote there,52 just as in Ethica. The notion of freedom is subsequently connec-
ted with it (ct notes 17, 18, supra). 'The fact that God can't refrain from doing 
what he does53 is not considered a disadvantage, for everything is to occur ne-
48 »[I]llud [ ... ] imperium violentissimum erit, ubi unicuique libertas dicendi, & docendi, 
quae sentit, negatur, & contra id moderatum, ubi haec eadem libertas unicuique conceditur.« 
TrHP, ch. XX. Opera vol. 3, 240. 
49 Ethica, part I, prop. 7. Opera vol. 2, 49. 
50 »Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non 
potest concipi, nisi existens.« Ethica, part I, deL I. Opera vol. 2,45. 
51 KV, part II, ch. XVI. Opera vol.1, 83;Appendix,axioma 6, ibid. 114. 
52 KV, part I, ch. Ill. Opera vol. 1,35. 
53 KV, part I, ch. VI. Opera vol. 1, 40, a position which is also defended in Ethica (cf. note 
29 supra). 
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cessarily according to God's nature; if God were imperfect, things would be dif-
ferent than they in fact are.54 
In Ethica, the matter is treated more comprehensively and with more nuance 
than in KV. Spinoza defines >freedom< there as follows: »That thing is called free 
which exists from the mere necessity of its nature and is merely determined to 
act by itself; that thing, however, is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is 
determined to exist and operate in a certain and determinate way by something 
else.«55 Spinoza distinguishes,in this way, >free< from >necessary<, but at the same 
time introduces necessity in his definition of >free<. A specific necessity, that of 
God's own nature, is the issue at hand. This appears to be problematic, as two 
irreconcilable notions are at stake here. 
In order to resolve this problem, he distinguishes between the two kinds of 
necessity mentioned in section 11 (note 34, supra). Something acts or is acted 
on56 necessarily because of the cause which underlies the situation; that God 
acts - he can but act; it is impossible that God should be acted OD, since God 
would otherwise only partly be the cause of nature and something besides him 
would exist, which is impossible - is necessary for another reason, namely that 
his power is his essence itself.57 Since he may unfold his being, he is free; since, 
nevertheless, this may only happen in One way, this process is characterized as 
necessary: »God, who exists absolutely freely, understands and works necessarily 
as well, for he exists, understands and works from the necessity of his nature.«58 
This quote shows that the notion >causa sui< is important in two respects. In 
the first place, it points out why God cannot be absent. The problems involved in 
this reasoning are primarily of interest with regard to metaphysical considera-
tions; I will not discuss these issues here. In the second place, the basis for God's 
freedom is indicated in this way. This is problematic as well; the difficulty lies in 
the fact that one is to grasp the unity of freedom and necessity. Spinoza's treat-
ment is, in my view, insufficient to gain certainty about God's freedom. 
Iv. Human freedam 
In Spinoza's view, God is free because he acts according to his own nature. It is 
difficult to make it clear wherein human freedom might consist. Still, Spinoza 
thinks man can be free. Unlike God, man isn't free in any case, but he does have 
54 KV, part I, ch. IV. Opera vol. 1,39. 
55 »Ea res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, & a se sola ad agen-
dum detenninatur: Necessaria autem, vel potius coacta, quae ab alio detenninatur ad existen-
dum, & operandum certa, ac determinata ratione.« Ethica, part I, def. VII. Opera vol. 2, 46. 
56 Spinoza's specific interpretation of >acting< is relevant here; cf. notes 22, 24 supra. 
57 Ethica, part I, prop. 34. Opera vol. 2, 76. 
58 »Deus, qui absolutee liber existit, intelligit, & operatur, necessaria etiam, nempe ex suae 
naturae necessitate existit, intelligit, & operatur.« TP, ch. I1, § 7. Opera vol. 3, 279. 
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the possibility to be so at his disposal. In a letter, he compares both types of free-
dom. Something is free, as was expounded in the previous section, »which exists 
and acts necessarily from its nature alone. God, for example, exists freely, albeit 
necessarily, since he exists from the necessity of his nature alone.«59 
He denies human freedom to be >free will< here, too; human freedom »con-
sists in this alone, that people are aware of their desires, and are ignorant of the 
causes by which they are determined.«6oThe point is that one doesn't determine 
one's actions, but is to have the right attitude with regard to the necessity that 
guides life. Reason is crucial here: a free man lives solely according to the pre-
cept of reason.61 
For Spinoza, there is, just as in the case of God's actions, no contradiction 
between freedom and necessity: »[ ... ] it is not incompatible to hold that a person 
is both determined by outside causes and is, at the same time, self-determined, 
at least in regard to particular actions. What this means is that a person may de-
tennine particular actions from his own nature alone, yet still be determined by 
outside causes.«62 Spinoza expresses it as follows: »It is a true freedom to be and 
remain chained by the lovely chains of God's love.«63 
It is part of freedom to love God: »We clearly understand wherein our salva-
tion, happiness or freedom consists, namely in the constant and eternal love to-
wards God, or in God's love towards human beings.«64 The following illustrates 
what Spinoza means by this: »He who understands himself and his affects clearly 
and distinctly, loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more under-
stands himself and his emotions.«65 It must be noted here that Spinoza defines 
>love< (>amor<) as »delight accompanied by the idea of an external cause«,66 
and that it is >intuitive knowing< (>scientia intuitiva<), which is the third sort of 
knowledge that Spinoza discerns,67 that leads to the understanding of God.68 
59 »[Q]uae ex sol§. suae naturae necessitate existit, & agit [ ... ]. Ex. gr. Deus, tametsi neces-
sario, Iibere tamen existit, quia ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit,« Letter 58. Opera vol. 
4,265. 
60 »[H]umana illa libertas [ ... ] in hoc solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitfis sint conscii, 
& causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari.« Letter 58. Opera vol. 4, 266. 
61 Ethica, part IV, prop. 67. Opera vol. 2, 261. 
62 loel!. Friedman: An Overview of Spinoza's Ethics. In: Synthese 37 (1978) 67-106, esp. 97. 
63 »[H]et [is] een waare vryheid [ ... ], met de Iieffelyke ketenen van [Gods] liefde geboeydt 
te zyn en te blyven.« KV, part 11, Ch. XXVI. Opera vol.1, 109. 
64 »[C]lare intelligimus, quil in re nostra salus,seu beatitude, seu Libertas consistit, nempe in 
constanti, & aeterno erga Deum Amore, sive in Amore Dei erga homine$.« Ethica, part V, prop. 
36, schol. Opera vol. 2, p. 303. 
65 »Qui se, suosque affectCts clare, & distinete inteiligit, Deum amat, & eo magis, quo se, suos-
que affeetas magis intelligit.« Ethica, part V, prop. 15. Opera vol. 2, 290. 
66 »Amor est Laetitia, concomitante ideil causae externae.« Ethica, part Ill, affectuum defi-
nitiones. def. 6. Opera vol. 2, 192. 
67 Ethica, part 11, prop. 40, schoL 11. Opera vol. 2, 122. 
68 Ethica, part V, prop. 25. Opera vol. 2, 296. 
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Indeed, one will realize the necessity of all things if one considers them through 
reason.69 If one doesn't approach things prejudiced and realizes that they were 
bound to happen, one will accept that they occur. Another positive consequence 
follows from the insight in this necessity (cf. note 23, supra). 
This explanation involves two problems. The first problem consists in the dif-
ficulty of uniting this defense of an all-embracing necessity with Spinoza's notion 
of freedom, and especially whether he takes the comprehensiveness of necessity 
seriously enough himself. A contradiction appears to arise in KV when Spinoza 
wants to illustrate how necessity and freedom are related. He says: »As long as 
man is a part of nature, he must follow the laws of nature, which is religion; and 
as long as he does, he partakes of well-being.«70 It is crucial what Spinoza un-
derstands by >IDust< here (the original- Dutch - word is >IDoet<). If this means: 
>IDaD is part of nature, and must therefore, being part of nature, follow its laws<, 
he merely points to the necessity in nature. However, there are two reasons to 
think this isn't his claim. 
First, he states that man partakes of well-being as long as he follows the laws 
of nature, which implies that it is possible to refrain from doing this and not to 
partake of well-being. One may also interpret this as: >man in fact partakes of 
well-being, as he (necessarily) follows these laws" but the fact that it wouldn't 
then matter what man's attitude would be pleads against this. He wouldn't ac-
complish his well-being actively by using reason; this would be brought about 
at any rate. >As long as he does< wouldn't refer to >as long as he uses reason<, 
but to >as long as he exists<. However, as Spinoza states that »man, being part of 
the entire nature, on which he depends, by which he is also governed, can't do 
anything by himself to achieve salvation and well-being",71 the problem doesn't 
manifest itself here per se. 
Second, and the interpretation is less ambiguous here, it is important what 
Spinoza understands by >the laws of nature< in this case. In Ethica, this pertains 
to that which is decisive for nature. In KV, Spinoza says, as becomes apparent 
from the quote (note 70, supra), that following the laws of nature is religion. By 
>religion<, he understands the following: «In this [that we dedicate everything to 
God, and love him merely because he is the most wonderful and perfect being, 
and we thus sacrifice ourselves completely to him] consists, in fact, both the true 
religion and our eternal salvation and happiness.«72 Spinoza's position on the 
69 Ethica, part n, prop. 44. Opera vol. 2,125; cf. note 22, supra. 
70 »[D]e mensch, zoo lange hy een deel van de Natuur is, zoo moet hy de wetten van de Na-
tuur volgen, het welk de godsdienst is. En zoo lange hy zulks doet, is hy in zyn welstand.« KV, 
part 11, ch. XVIII. Opera vol.l, 88. 
71 »[D]e mensch als zynde een deel van geheel de Natuur, van welke hy afhangt, van welke 
hy ook geregeert word, uyt syn zelve niet jets kan doen tot zyn heyJ en welstand.« KV, part n, 
ch. XVIII. Opera vol.l,86,87. 
72 »[H]ier in [dat wy alles aan God toeeigenen, hem alleen beminnen, omdat hy de heer-
lykste, en aldervolmaaktste is, en ons zelven alzoo hem geheeJ opofferen] bestaat eigentlyk, en 
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love towards God in Ethica (cf. note 64,supra) agrees with this, but this does pre-
suppose a contribution by man and this time one may not, as in the first instance, 
suffice with the idea that man is part of nature. 
Spinoza is faced with a contradiction. He does, after all, state that »God's laws 
don't have such a character that they might be infringed upon.«73 It is no wonder 
that this difficulty emerges, as Spinoza is trying to bring activity and passivity in 
human actions on a par, which cannot easily, if at all, be made intelligible: »When 
we say that some things are within our power and others are beyond it, we un-
derstand by those which are in our power, the ones that we realize by the order 
or together with nature, of which we are part.«74 
In Ethica, too, the problem is manifest. From Spinoza's attitude towards af-
fects, it turns out that the ideas are decisive: »An affect which is a passion ceases 
to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.«7S Since he in-
dicates that the order of ideas is the same as that of things,76 the question ensues 
where human freedom is to be located. It is crucial whether one has adequate 
ideas or not: »Qur mind, insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts, and 
insofar as it has inadequate ideas, is necessarily acted on.«77 Are the actions 
brought about by adequate ideas? Spinoza affirms this: »The actions of the mind 
originate from adequate ideas alone.«78 This entails that one is dependent on 
ideas in order to be free; on this basis, one becomes free. 
de waare godsdienst, en ous eeuwig heyl en gelukzaligheid.« KV, part 11, ch. XVIII. Opera vol. 
1,88. 
73 »Gods wetten [zyn] niet en [ ... ] van zoo een natuur, datze zoude konnen worden overge-
treden.« KV, part 11, ch. XXIV. Opera vol.1, 104. 
74 »[A}ls wy zeggen dat eenige dingen in, andere buy ten onse magt zyn, zoo verstaan wy, 
door die welke in onse macht zyn zulke die wy uytwerken, door ordre of te zamen met de Na-
tuurwaar van wy een deel zyn«. KV, part 11, ch. V. Opera voI.1,64. The last part of this sentence 
may also be translated thus: »[O]r together with the nature of which we are part.«This remains 
closer to the actual text, since it contains a definite article and lacks a comma after >Natuur< 
(>nature<), but the version without the article and with the amplifying clause (rather than the 
restrictive clause) seems to me to remain closer to Spinoza's main idea (the alternative would 
imply the existence of more than one nature). 
7'5 »Affectus, qui passio es~ desinit esse passio, simulatque ejus claram, & distinctam formamus 
ideam.« Ethica, part V, prop. 3. Opera vo!. 2, 282. In the translation, I have left out the commas 
after >affectus< (>affect<) and the first occurrence of >passio< (>passioD<) as an amplifying clause 
would otherwise be rendered, which would conflict with the possibility of an affect ceasing to 
be a passion, as Spinoza argues. 
76 Ethica, part 1I, prop. 7. Opera vol. 2, 89. 
77 »Mens nostra quaedem agit, quaedam vera patitur, nempe quatenus adaequatas habet ideas, 
eatenus quaedam necessaria agit, & quatenus ideas habet inadaequatas. eatenus necessaria quae-
dam patitur.« Ethica, part Ill, prop. 1. Opera vol. 2,140. 
78 »Mentis actiones ex so/is ideis adaequatis oriuntur [.,.].« Ethica, part Ill, prop. 3. Opera 
vo!. 2, 144. This is, incidentally, not a superfluous addition: in proposition 1 of part III of Ethica, 
Spinoza merely states that the presence of adequate ideas is a sufficient condition in order to 
act; here, he makes it clear that their presence is a necessary condition as well. If, in other words, 
there are adequate ideas, one acts and if one acts, adequate ideas are present 
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The difficulty with this is that freedom is seen as the result of acting in some 
way. This implies that one is, without contributing anything oneself, led to a si-
tuation in which ODe is, supposedly, free. The notion >free< is insufficient to cha-
racterize this situation. If one wants to speak of freedom, this can only consist in 
acting, not in the situation caused by this, for otherwise it would only be a matter 
of freedom of movement (the first of the four types of freedom distinguished 
in section I). 1bis possibility isn't open to Spinoza either, however. If one were 
to bring the adequate ideas about oneself, on what basis would this take place? 
Spinoza's own conviction of necessity works against him in this case: some cause 
that leads to the occurrence of an adequate idea may always be submitted, and 
if one should acknowledge a >free< individual, this isn't taken into consideration. 
Hence, the observation that Spinoza's claim that freedom is supposed to lie in 
insight isn't elaborated enough79 appears to be correct. 
The second problem is closely connected with this; it is, in fact, a sub-problem 
to the first. In TP, Spinoza says: »Most people believe that the ignorant disturb 
the order of nature rather than follow it, and conceive human beings in nature 
like a realm within a realm.«80 Spinoza criticizes this conception: it isolates a cer-
tain position from necessity, an >imperium in imperio< (>realm within a realm<) 
where one is imagined to be free. The formulation >imperium in imperio< is also 
present in Ethica,81 with the same meaning as in TP.82 The only person he men-
tions there by name is Descartes. Elsewhere, he attacks the Stoics on the same 
issue: »The Stoics thought that the affects depend absolutely on our will, and 
that we can absolutely govern them.«83 (Of course, matters should not be over-
simplified here.84) 
There seems, indeed, to be a distinction in (early) Stoicism (it is at least attri-
buted to Chrysippus) between >causae adiuvantes et proximae< (>auxiliary and 
proximate causes<) and >causae perfectae et principales<) (>perfect and primary 
causes<), external (or antecedent) causes being complemented by a domain 
where room is - supposedly -left to (partially) decide an outcome.85 
Do Spinoza's ideas deviate enough from such a view to make sure that the 
criticism he directs at (among others) Descartes and the Stoics doesn't strike his 
79 Riidiger Bittner: Spinozas Gedanke, daB Einsicht befreit. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift flir Phi-
losophie 42 (1994) 96J.-971. esp. 970, 971. 
80 »[p]lerique, ignaros naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi, credunt, & homines 
in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipiunt.« TP, ch. Il, § 6. Opera vol. 3, 277. 
81 Ethica, part Ill, praef. Opera vo!. 2, 137. 
82 Incidentally, the phrase appears in TIHP as well (ch. XVII. Opera vo!. 3, 220), but it has 
a different meaning there. 
83 »Stoici [ ... ] putllrunt [affectfrs] a nostra voluntate absolute pendere, nosque lis absolute 
imperare posse.« Ethica, part V, praef. Opera vo!. 2, 277. 
84 Cf. Herman de Dijn: Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza. In: Studia Leibnitiana 
22 (1990) 138-150. esp. 146. 
85 M. Tullius Cicero: De fato 41--44,ed. by Remo Giomini (Leipzig 1975) 170,171. 
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own philosophy as well? He appears to consider reason as a tower of strength, 
and how is this different from the >imperium in imperio< to which those who 
Spinoza accuses of being ignorant adhere? 
In Ethica, he states that one may acquire power over the affects by insight: 
»The more an affect is known to us, the more it is in our power, and the less the 
mind is acted on by it.«86 This results from the fact that no affect is a passion if 
one has a clear and distinct idea of it (cf. note 75, supra). The pivotal question is: 
is one free to create this clear and distinct idea oneself! If so, Spinoza resorts to 
a realm within a realm; if not, it is not up to man to relieve himself of the passion. 
The last proposition in Ethica seems to provide clarification. Here, he proclaims: 
»Because we rejoice in virtue, we are able to restrain our lusts.«87 Spinoza uses 
the word >coercere< (>restrain<), which evidences that he sees an active role for 
man here; the word may also mean: >keep within the bounds<, and these bounds 
appear to serve exactly to mark a realm within a realm, so that the problem in 
Ethica is clear. 
In TP, conversely, Spinoza takes a strikingly consistent position: »Experience 
amply demonstrates that it is no more in our power to have a sound mind than to 
have a sound body.«88 It is difficult to assess whether Spinoza really did reconsi-
der the ideas upon which the problematic conclusions in Ethica are founded: the 
presentation of TP is quite different from that of Ethica and although there are 
similarities in content, the goals they aim at are far apart. Moreover, TP hasn't 
been completed, so that it doesn't necessarily contain Spinoza's final thoughts, 
and he proves to cling to a notion of freedom in this writing again.89 
Be that as it may, the train of thought presented in TP is more in line with the 
general necessity that is described in both writings than the situation in which 
some freedom is still granted to exist. If one does adhere to the latter possibility, 
external and internal causes are distinguished, the external being supposed to be 
outside one's power, the internal to belong to it. 
This distinction is untenable and needs to be given up. That Spinoza's me-
thod is useful and may lead, as he argues,90 to peace of mind, I won't deny. That 
one may reach this peace of mind in freedom, however, I can't affinn unreser-
vedly. 
86 »Affectus [ ... ] eo magis in nostril potestate est, & Mens ab eo minus patitur,quo nobis est 
notior.« Ethica, part V, prop. 3, cor. Opera vo12, 282. 
'61 »[Q]uia [virtutem} gaudemus, ideo libidines coercere possumus.« Ethica, part V, prop. 42. 
Opera vol. 2, 307. 
88 }>[E]xperientia satis superque doeet, quOd in nostra potestate non magis sit, Mentem san-
am, quam Corpus sanum habere.« TP, ch. Il, §6. Opera vol. 3, 278. 
89 TP, ch. Il, § 11. Opera vol. 3, 280. 
90 Ethica, part n, prop. 49, sehol. Opera vol. 2, 135,136; part V, prop. 27, ibid. 297. 
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V. The basic analysis 
In order to ascertain whether freedom of the second and fourth kind, as di-
stinguished in section I, may be defended, it is important on what grounds one 
acts. Spinoza's treatment of this issue already makes it clear that it is difficult to 
defend the second kind. In this last section, I will elaborate on this and present 
a possible approach. 
Does One decide for oneself on what basis one will act? It is possible that 
the world, as a whole, has developed, and keeps developing, on the basis of a 
necessary process. Such a view agrees with Spinoza's outlook. If this possibility 
is accepted, the issue is rapidly resolved:91 man isn't free, since everything takes 
place within the overall structure within which his actions are necessarily per-
formed necessarily.92 The problem is, of course, that this point of view cannot 
be accepted without a further exposition, such as Spinoza's own metaphysical 
foundation. I think, for a number of reasons which I can't set out here, that his 
arguments in that respect don't suffice. One may argue that the process of de-
velopment was necessary, but alternatives to this view are also possible. I can't 
decide the issue, since I can't view things from a different perspective than the 
one I actually have; I only know the process as it presents itself to me, and am 
therefore unable to assess whether it is necessary or not. 
It may, however, be possible to decide whether freedom is possible if one 
investigates the individual situations, i.e., at the level of the actions. It is difficult 
to decide whether one is thus determined to act as one does. Of course, as soon 
as some ground is ascertained to be the basis of an action, this presupposes the 
occurrence of a factor:93 one may suppose a factor-free realm, but (presumably) 
can't imagine it. Still, this doesn't entail that acting on another basis than factors 
is impossible, although I cannot conceive of such a course of events. (By saying 
that this isn't impossible, I don't want to suggest that I can imagine how this 
might take place, but merely that I can imagine that it might be the case.) 
The question remains: on what basis does one act? Does one decide one's 
own actions, or are there merely factors? A domain of freedom seems to present 
itself; may one not, as soon as one has (or seems to have) chosen something, 
deviate from the original decision and choose an alternative? This presupposes 
without justification that the general necessity isn't the case. Besides, it means 
91 Unless one resorts to a compatibilist outlook, which doesn't suffice, for reasons I can't 
elaborate here. Suffice it to say here that compatibilism presents a balanced account, but is 
still obliged to explain how >free will< is pOSSible, so that the issue arises here as well, albeit at 
another point in the exposition than in the case of libertarianism. 
92 This is not a slip of the pen: the actions are necessarily performed, as they are part of 
the process, and as such they occur necessarily (and not freely), since there is but one possible 
outcome. 
93 >Pactof< originaUy (in Latin) means >creator<, so factors are the things that decide actions 
if they are the only elements involved. 
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that another decision is simply given more weight than the previous one and 
becomes decisive for that reason. The point is that one doesn't grant this weight 
to the decision oneself if there isn't any other guidance than that resulting from 
factors. 
The problem that hasn't been solved, and which I don't pretend to be able to 
solve here, is that it has merely been demonstrated that it is difficult to show that 
something other than factors would lie at the root of actions; the impossibility 
of this situation isn't given with this. After all, if one doesn't want to commit an 
argumentum ad ignorantiam, another basis for actions than factors can't simply 
be dismissed as impossible, even if it isn't clear wherein this would consist. 
Conclusion 
Spinoza's contribution to the issue to what degree freedom is possible is ad-
mirable. He doesn't shun far-reaching observations and manages to present a 
number of results which appear to be irrefutable. He demonstrates, with a re-
markable clarity, the problems involved with >free wilk Concerning the all-em-
bracing necessity to which he points, I think one should be cautious to use this as 
a basic idea. Spinoza doesn't manage to clarify how God's necessity and freedom 
may be united. The same results are derived with regard to human freedom if 
one suspends judgment regarding the issue whether everything follows straight 
from God's nature and simply analyzes the process on the basis of which the 
actions are performed. The consistency which is characteristic for his philosophy 
in general is absent here. 
One has to make an effort to find the problems in Spinoza's thoughts in 
this respect. That doesn't take away the fact that those that do emerge need to 
be brought to attention. The continual element in his defense of the minimal 
amount of human freedom which is still supposed to exist is reason. Through 
reason, one may decide how one deals with the fact that everything happens ne-
cessarily. This is problematic, for the reasons pointed out in section 4. Spinoza's 
position, whose interpretation of freedom leaves a small island of inconsistency, 
seems at odds with his overall analysis of freedom and necessity. That doesn't 
mean, of course, that everything he says needs to be re-evaluated. The critical re-
marks I have expressed here seem to me to be necessary - perhaps in more than 
one sense of the word -, but they don't diminish the value of his thoughts when 
it comes to the uncompromising way in which the conclusions are reached. His 
position i~ on the whole, clear and generates a number of difficulties for those 
defending any sort of freedom aside from freedom of movement. 
